Rumsfeld's Army

As you very well may know, I support the Secretary of War in his efforts at recalibrating the American military for the 21'st century in spite of the negative karma swirling around him in the media regarding his tenure. Donald Rumsfeld has his work cut out for him but I have full faith and confidence in his abilities and his judgment in erecting a military that is both flexible and powerful enough in carrying out the missions as ordered by the President of the United States in opposition to the War Of Terror being imposed upon us by state-sponsored Islamic terrorism.

I believe a lot of the complaints and bitching about Rumsfeld by ex-army/marine generals is rather disingenuous on their part since they themselves exposed their "issues" in the narcissistic media rather than in the chain of command where such grieviences are typically handled or at least they didn't keep it within military circles but chose, not coincentally, to expose themselves after they retired. Considering this is an election year, I suppose we shouldn't be surprised. A rather informative article regarding the Secretary of Defense in TCS Daily highlights with great clarity the objectives and hurdles Secretary Rumsfeld faces as we conduct the War On Terror.

From TCS Daily:

War, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously observed, is the continuation of politics by other means. He could have just as easily said military planning, for our politics determine how we will use the military instrument and just how sharp -- or blunt -- that instrument must be.

Donald Rumsfeld returned to the post of Defense Secretary in 2000 with a clear view of both the politics and the instrument. He promised to transform the military from the plodding, manpower intensive force of the Cold War into a leaner, networked military which would employ superior firepower and maneuver to compensate for fewer soldiers and lighter ground vehicles. This military, with its emphasis on remotely piloted aircraft and high altitude, precision strike capability, could produce quicker victories against a broader array of threats -- and with fewer casualties. It would have fewer massive bases overseas and more "forward operating sites" -- bare-bones facilities where supplies, troops and equipment could be "surged" in the event of conflict.

I believe the author to be correct in that politics shapes both the objective as well as the size of the military and thus the generals are subservient to the vicissitudes permeating Washington DC at any given moment. Politics and policies therefore determine the demeanor and size of the military and not the otherway around even during time of war.

The article continues:

This vision of "military transformation" was not uniquely Rumsfeld's. Many scholars and service-members had been promoting the "revolution in military affairs" before he arrived at the Pentagon. But Rumsfeld seized on it with a single minded determination. The theory of transformation had the usual retinue of critics and cheerleaders, but the press was largely interested in which weapons system were on the chopping block (and by extension, which pork-addled members of Congress were positioning themselves between the knife) - not to mention how the Army was peeved at Rumsfeld's management style. Rarely did the press focus on the core question of just what political ends this Rumsfeldian military was being built to accomplish. The transformation debates took place in what was, before the Iraq war, a political vacuum.

Rumsfeld knew what kind of military he was building and he knew what that military was supposed to do. In a January 2002 speech, he listed six criteria:

"First, to protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas. Second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters. Third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect them from our reach. Fourth, to protect our information networks from attack. Fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so that they can in fact fight jointly. And sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack."

I know for most people the issue of whether we mainatin a pre-9/11 army or a post-9/11 army is inconsequential but I assure you this topic is terribly important and will shape American Foreign Policy to come for many years if not decades. The Cold War was fought defensively as these policies were at first conceived by Democrat administrations in the Roosevelt/Truman era and thus had far ranging effects on American Foreign Policy from 1945 - 1989.

This administration has set a new standard in motion that is offensive in nature and relies primarily on more lighter/mobile forces that are compliemented by Air Force and Naval assets mulitplying their destructive abilities on the ground in support of these lighter forces. We have not yet used the entire spectrum of our military in the War On Terror, namely the use of nuclear munitions. A lot of the angst expressed by Democrats thus are reflective of their appetite for stale and old cold war policies that are no longer operational in a post-9/11 world. With the destruction of the World Trade Center those days are no longer with us.

Basically, the article states that Rumsfeld adhered to this new doctrine in spite of the need towards nation-building such as in Iraq which supposidely requires massive occupational troops to carry the nation into being a "productive" member in the world of civilized nations. I do disagree with the author that this can't be achieved without more troops than we currently have. The Iraqi's, if they truly want freedom, will do just fine with our "token" force in Iraq. The problems besetting this nation have nothing to do with Rumsfeld's doctrine or the number of American troops as it does with Syrian and Iranian interference in Mesopotamia. The Arab and Persian armies are paper-tigers and it will not take much to overthrow them as one might think. Thus, until we invade Syria and Iran, the IED's, the Baathists, and the general anarchy will continue to prevail in the Sunni Triangle.

The article goes on:

Yet despite calls from generals -- armchair or otherwise -- to increase the size of the Army, Rumsfeld has refused.

It is in Iraq where the rubber of Rumsfeld's doctrine is meeting the road of American purpose. President Bush has embraced (in Mead's terminology) the Wilsonian mission of democracy promotion, yet supports a Defense Secretary who continues to build an army designed to do anything but. It is not a sustainable contradiction. Either the U.S. backs off nation building or adapts transformation to accommodate more stabilization and reconstruction missions (read: a significant increase in reserve forces available for post-conflict duty). In short, the U.S. has to decide what kind of foreign policy it wants before it builds its military.

I believe the Bush Administration already has decided this foreign policy and its called the Long War. It may be institutionally impossible to change the Middle East in its current Islamic format, however, we must first defeat the enemy before any "civilization-building" can begin and I must say we have just begun to fight.

Finally the article finishes:

The Wall Street Journal's Greg Jaffe noted in 2003 that: "Victory in Iraq promises to offer a big boost to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's mission to transform how the U.S. military fights, what it buys and where it goes."

In an odd twist, so could failure. It's an open question whether the public's increasing unease about the Iraq mission will translate into a rebuke of Rumsfeld's policies or an endorsement. Looking into the tumult in Baghdad, the public might conclude, not that Rumsfeld was wrong to under-man the occupation, but that he was right to reject such a mission for the U.S. in the first place.

Only time, and future defense secretaries, will tell.

I say, "Carry on, Mr. Secretary! Carry on!".